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IMAGINING AND RATIONALIZING
OPPORTUNITIES: INDUCTIVE REASONING AND
THE CREATION AND JUSTIFICATION OF
NEW VENTURES
JOEP P. CORNELISSEN
JEAN S. CLARKE
University of Leeds
We argue that creating novel ventures consists of inductive analogical or metaphor-
ical reasoning, which generates a platform for the creation and commercialization of
novel ventures and facilitates the comprehension and justification of a venture. We
argue that such inductive reasoning is shaped by two determinants (the applicability
of prior entrepreneurial experience and the motivation to resolve uncertainty and
acquire legitimacy) that interrelate to predict and explain patterns of analogical and
metaphorical reasoning by which novice and experienced entrepreneurs construct
meaning for themselves as well as others in the early stages of creating a venture.
The creation of new ventures is a process by
which entrepreneurs come to imagine the oppor-
tunity for novel ventures, refine their ideas, and,
after an initial investment, justify their ventures
to relevant others to gain much-needed support
and legitimacy (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Mc-
Mullen & Shepherd, 2006). Yet how do entrepre-
neurs come to create and justify new ventures in
such a way that they acquire institutional legit-
imacy and the necessary resources for venture
growth? Despite an increase in conceptualizing
and specifying the process of entrepreneurship
(e.g., Zott & Huy, 2007), research has not fully
addressed this question, with most accounts the-
oretically or empirically equating the processwith
antecedent cognitive scripts or characteristics of
entrepreneurs (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006; Busen-
itz & Barney, 1997; Shane, 2000) or with perfor-
mance outcomes and the achievement of legiti-
macy in an industry (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Starr &
MacMillan, 1990). However, equating entrepre-
neurship with such antecedents or outcomes
overemphasizes either the individual and his or
her present cognitive state or the configuration
of the social context and institutional outcomes,
at the expense of a more integrative under-
standing that embeds individual entrepreneurs
within their social contexts (e.g., Garud &
Karnøe, 2003; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).
We argue that a sensemaking approach (e.g.,
Taylor & Van Every, 2000; Weick, 1995), which
emphasizes a direct relationship among the lan-
guage, cognition, and enactment of entrepre-
neurs, may help develop a combined cognitive
and symbolic conception of the process by
which the idea for a novel venture is imagined,
refined, and justified to others. Adopting this
approach, we elaborate theory on how individ-
ual entrepreneurs use certain forms of speech—
specifically, analogy and metaphor—to induce
an opportunity for a novel venture. They use
these devices too while speaking to relevant
others, such as employees and (prospective) in-
vestors, in order to acquire needed capital and
support to make those ventures succeed (Al-
varez & Barney, 2007; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995).
Specifically, we aim to make a number of con-
tributions. First, we conceptualize processes of
inductive analogical and metaphorical reason-
ing supporting the creation and justification of
novel ventures. Despite the recognized impor-
tance of induction in entrepreneurship (e.g.,
Baron & Ward, 2004), little theory or research in
entrepreneurship exists on when, how, and why
entrepreneurs use inductive reasoning (Ward,
2004) to move beyond their current understand-
ing and produce novel ventures (Baron & Ward,
2004). Second, we develop a process theory of
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new venture creation that specifies two determi-
nants: (1) the availability and applicability of
prior entrepreneurial experience and (2) the mo-
tivation to resolve uncertainty and to gain legit-
imacy for novel ventures. These determinants
interrelate to predict and explain patterns of
inductive reasoning by entrepreneurs in the
early stages of creating a venture (i.e., the
stages of initial exploration, planning, and
launch). Third, we combine and reconceptualize
the predictions of theory on entrepreneurial cog-
nition (e.g., Mitchell, Busenitz, Lant, & McDou-
gall, 2002) and institutional legitimacy (e.g.,
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) in our process theory.
We go on to offer a pragmatic and conceptual
approach to the difficult task of bridging the
related but largely separate cognitive literature
and institutional literature on entrepreneurship.
Fourth, the process theory we propose provides
a methodological contribution: it can be readily
connected to the sophisticated techniques de-
veloped in linguistics and discourse analysis
(e.g., Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001) for analyzing
shifts and changes in how entrepreneurs induc-
tively reason about novel ventures. These tech-
niques make it possible to complement the
study of entrepreneurial cognition or institu-
tional effects with empirical studies of how en-
trepreneurs—through moment-by-moment com-
munication and interaction with others—come
to envision, refine, and justify ideas for a novel
venture.
In the paper we focus on the development of
independent new ventures that are not shel-
tered by sponsoring organizations (e.g., spin-
offs). By definition, such ventures are associated
with high levels of uncertainty; this forces the
entrepreneur to make the enterprise comprehen-
sible and meaningful to key stakeholders.
Throughout the article we refer to new ventures
as commercial enterprises that are imagined
and rationalized by an entrepreneur in relation
to specific emerging or established markets and
industries.
We present our arguments as follows. We pro-
vide an overview of past cognitive and institu-
tional research on entrepreneurship and pro-
pose and develop an alternative perspective,
grounded in sensemaking, that we believe inte-
grates and extends our understanding of the
creation and legitimization of new ventures. We
then develop a specific model of new venture
creation, integrating predictions from entrepre-
neurial cognition and institutional theory. Fi-
nally, we discuss the implications of this model
for the study of entrepreneurship and new ven-
ture creation and end with specific recommen-
dations for empirical research.
NEW VENTURE CREATION
The study of new venture creation primarily
has been addressed in two related yet largely
separate bodies of literature. The first, generally
referred to as the cognitive perspective, has fo-
cused on the cognitive characteristics of individ-
ual entrepreneurs and the possession of prior
knowledge as the primary basis for identifying
and designing new ventures (e.g., Baron, 2000;
Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Gre´goire, Corbett, &
McMullen, in press; Shane, 2000). When entre-
preneurs make sense of market opportunities
and the possibility for a new venture, scholars
see this as largely an individual cognitive pro-
cess. Scholars subsequently subdivide their at-
tention among different features of this process,
such as an entrepreneur’s perceptual noticing
and bracketing of breaks in his or her experi-
ence and the richness and specificity of the en-
trepreneur’s cognitive prototypes, scripts, or
mental models (i.e., cognitive frameworks ac-
quired through experience; Baron & Ensley, 2006;
Korunka, Frank, Luegar, & Mugler, 2003;
Krueger, Reilly, & Carsrud, 2000). For example,
when entrepreneurs gain repeated experiences
within certain markets or in the development of
ventures, they build richer and more specific
mental models or scripts of their environment
(e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006; Gre´goire et al., in
press; Mitchell, Smith, Seawright, & Morse,
2000). They can then draw on or cognitively ex-
tend such mental models or scripts to new situ-
ations and, in the process, identify the opportu-
nity for a new venture.
A main limitation of this cognitive perspective
is that it at times treats the individual entrepre-
neur in isolation from his or her social environ-
ment, and it is unable to capture or explain how
entrepreneurs are creative and how, through in-
ductive reasoning, they may imagine or create
novel opportunities that surpass their past (cog-
nitively accumulated) experiences (Baron &
Ward, 2004). The main reason for this is that
cognitive scripts or mental models provide by
themselves no rules or guidelines for the inter-
pretation of and inductive reasoning about
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novel circumstances (Edwards, 1997; Weick,
1995). Within the cognitive perspective, an entre-
preneur’s speech is also seen as “revealing”
cognitive interpretations (Donnellon, 1986;
Gioia, 1986); when entrepreneurs label and ar-
ticulate their experiences while communicating
to others, they externalize or express “some neu-
tral, definitive and ready-made sense of events
produced through a process such as noticing
what the world is like and then putting it into
words” (Edwards, 1997: 144). Accordingly, the
cognitive perspective focuses on individual
modes of thought without speech and outside a
social context, casting aside the formative effect
of language, particularly online speech, on
thought processes and the construction of mean-
ing (e.g., Fauconnier, 1997; Langacker, 1991).
A second body of literature, under the broad
heading of institutional theory, has located en-
trepreneurship within a social context and has
focused on cultural and symbolic realms of
meaning construction around new ventures
(e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens, Jen-
nings, & Jennings, 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007). Given
that most new ventures lack proven track
records, obvious asset value, and profitability,
entrepreneurs are forced to draw on a common
discourse to construct accounts that help ex-
plain, rationalize, and promote a new venture
and increase its perceived legitimacy in the
eyes of resource providers (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). The discourse (e.g.,
frames, codes, and myths) that individual entre-
preneurs use in this process is viewed as an
outgrowth of social categories and social pro-
cesses of disseminating and sharing informa-
tion (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001; Weber, 2005). Zil-
ber (2006) and Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey
(2008), for example, show how entrepreneurs in
social movements and high-tech ventures en-
listed cultural codes and myths to create “cul-
tural resonance” between their specific framing
of a venture and the broader value orientations
of stakeholders. The institutional tradition high-
lights a sociolinguistic focus (Putnam &
Fairhurst, 2001) on how the specific speech of
entrepreneurs evokes salient cultural codes or
frames that encode the criteria for institutional
legitimacy by appealing to collective shared un-
derstandings and norms for how novel ventures
are sensible, acceptable, and legitimate (Al-
drich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1994; Zott & Huy, 2007).
A main limitation of the institutional tradition
is that it does not connect to the material context
in which entrepreneurs create or identify oppor-
tunities for novel ventures. In addition, insofar
as it treats social structures as relatively stable
and it assumes fixed, socially shared linguistic
repertoires (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001), institu-
tional theory is also unable to explain how in-
dividual entrepreneurs pragmatically and cre-
atively make sense of the world around them on
particular occasions (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obst-
feld, 2005). Within the broader institutional liter-
ature, this limitation is reflected in concerns
about studies of institutionalization that focus
almost exclusively on established conventions,
codes, and symbols and how these are being
translated, enlisted, or evoked in local contexts
(e.g., Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy 2004). The un-
derlying assumption is that, once internalized,
the social competence of individuals in speak-
ing a (socially shared) language will subse-
quently act “as internalized cognitive con-
straints on sensemaking” (Weber & Glynn, 2006:
1640). In other words, speech is socially condi-
tioned and constrained and is largely repro-
duced in a rote, habitual manner without con-
scious thought.
We argue that the respective foci and limita-
tions of both traditions suggest they are comple-
mentary: the cognitive tradition stresses the in-
ternal, self-conscious, and cognitive process of
entrepreneurs’ developing an account of what is
going on, while the institutional tradition em-
phasizes the external, strategic process of evok-
ing meaning in line with political interests. It
thus appears that much may be gained from
moving toward an approach that sees entrepre-
neurial actions and new venture creation as not
exclusively the outcome of either cognitive pro-
cesses or of processes “in the sphere of symbolic
codes” (Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992: 152).
SENSEMAKING AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTION
To establish such an approach, better linking
the individual entrepreneur with the social con-
text, we draw on the broad perspective of sense-
making (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Weick, 1995).
Within the context of entrepreneurship, Hill and
Levenhagen (1995: 1057) argue that entrepre-
neurs “operate at the edge of what they do not
know” and must seek to make equivocal events
2010 541Cornelissen and Clarke
nonequivocal by constructing a new vision of
the business environment (Alvarez & Barney,
2007). In the early stages of creating a new ven-
ture, entrepreneurs also need to speak to others
about this vision in order to gain feedback and
their support (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Hill and
Levenhagen (1995) propose that such visions
and the opportunities that they imply may be
perceptually or unconsciously “felt” but are con-
figured into more elaborate presentations when
they are verbally articulated.
We take as a starting point Hill and Levenha-
gen’s (1995) view that the formative effects of
language on thought processes (e.g., Langacker,
1991) need to be incorporated and theorized in
the context of entrepreneurial action and new
venture creation. While the inner thoughts and
imaginations of entrepreneurs matter, they are
not spoken or even necessarily speakable; to get
to speech, something further takes place, and
this is what we term sensemaking. Functionally,
sensemaking occurs at the point where new
(verbal) ideas take form in the stream of the
entrepreneur’s experience, with external speech
reconfiguring ideas to fit the demands of spoken
language. Sensemaking, in other words, is an
act of turning circumstances “into a situation
that is comprehended explicitly in words and
that serves as a springboard to action” (Taylor &
Van Every, 2000: 40; see also Weick et al., 2005:
409).
Sensemaking implies that the world does not
present itself in a direct or “raw form,” but,
rather, entrepreneurs actively construct it using
available linguistic frames, including prefabri-
cated vocabularies (Weber, 2005) that become
elaborated in a coherent way, thus shaping
thinking while speaking. Although sensemak-
ing has often been considered as retrospective
(e.g., Weick et al., 2005), it may also be prospec-
tive in the context of new ventures and “aimed
at creating meaningful opportunities for the fu-
ture” (Gioia & Mehra, 1996: 1229). Entrepreneurs,
for example, are likely to rearrange or blend
words creatively in the form of analogies or met-
aphors in their speech; this allows them to imag-
ine future opportunities and to make those op-
portunities understood by others (Hill &
Levenhagen, 1995; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).
Sensemaking is also a dynamic process, with
the social context of speaking and interactions
with others affecting the construction of mean-
ing about a new venture (Slobin, 1987; see also
Alvarez & Barney, 2007, and Hill & Levenhagen,
1995). Within this process, thought and language
are intimately and dynamically connected at
the point where entrepreneurs verbalize their
experiences and elaborate these in a context of
speaking to others. Baker, Miner, and Eesley’s
(2003) study of entrepreneurial start-ups pro-
vides an example of this process. Their study
shows that the design and implementation of
new start-ups was not only “psychological or
driven by internal needs” but was also signifi-
cantly “driven by exogenous demands by exter-
nal resource providers for founders to provide
accounts that make their firms appear like
legitimate investment opportunities, suppliers
or customers” (2003: 264). The result was an
improvisational process, with the design and
implementation of these ventures emerging at
least in part from verbal interactions with re-
source providers.
The crucial point here is that the social con-
text interacts with processes of language use
and cognition. We therefore cannot draw too
sharp a distinction between sensemaking for
oneself and sensegiving to others (Tetlock &
Manstead, 1985). Once entrepreneurs communi-
cate with others, these instances already inte-
grate social pressures for persuasion and justi-
fication with linguistic and cognitive processes
of sensemaking. While this is a general feature
of online processes of meaning construction
(Fauconnier, 2000), it has been largely lost in the
general body of sensemaking research (e.g.,
Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005; for a comprehen-
sive review see Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010),
where individual cognition (sensemaking) is
typically divorced from symbolic processes of
influence and impression management (sense-
giving) in social settings.
Our goal here is to favor neither cognitive
accounts (that see an entrepreneur’s sensemak-
ing and action in context as derived from and
determined by cognitive interpretations) nor
symbolic accounts (that see it as largely condi-
tioned and bounded by the discursive fields or
communities in which entrepreneurs operate).
Instead, we aim to conceptualize how language
and thought interpenetrate in context and how
meaning is not fixed but continually developing
as a result of interactions with others. Such an
approach does not deny agency or structure but
shifts attention to individual acts of sensemak-
ing around the early stages of new venture cre-
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ation. Specifically, we conceptualize how,
through analogical and metaphorical reason-
ing, entrepreneurs not only imagine new ven-
tures that surpass their past experiences but
also, through such reasoning, attempt to estab-
lish shared understanding, support, and legiti-
macy for their burgeoning ventures. In the initial
stages of a venture, entrepreneurs make sense
of opportunities for novel ventures by setting
these apart from what already exists while lo-
cating their ideas within stakeholders’ existing
understandings in order to gain acceptance and
support (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Santos &
Eisenhardt, 2009). A sensemaking approach,
therefore, bridges the established cognitive and
institutional traditions in that it sees language
as not simply an extension or representation of
cognitively recorded experiences but as actu-
ally formative of thought and, hence, as a re-
source that individuals use to create or produce
a common understanding of new ventures.
A central assumption underlying our theoriz-
ing is that individual entrepreneurs are “theo-
rists of a pragmatic sort” (Strang & Meyer, 1993;
Tetlock, 2000; Weick, 1995). They self-consciously
and through verbal interactions with others de-
velop notions about cause and effect, thus “the-
orizing” their world and the relationships and
opportunities within it (Alvarez & Barney, 2007;
Tetlock, 2000). At the individual level, entrepre-
neurs may be viewed as intuitive scientists, en-
gaged in a continuous struggle to achieve cog-
nitive mastery of their world (Sarasvathy, 2004),
or as intuitive economists, using the resulting
cognitive representations to identify courses of
action that advance, if not maximize, their inter-
ests (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). In a social
context entrepreneurs may be seen as intuitive
politicians (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) or cultural
operators (Rao, 1994; Zott & Huy, 2007) who seek
to be accountable to different social groups and
whose choices and judgments are embedded
in and constrained by the “broader social and
cultural dynamics that embed start-ups”
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001: 546). These different
individual-cognitive and social-cultural images
of entrepreneurs are, as mentioned, not concep-
tually incompatible. In fact, some key works in
the cognitive and institutional traditions ac-
knowledge or implicitly assume that the indi-
vidual and social realms can be bridged (Di-
Maggio, 1997; March & Olsen, 1989). In this
article we similarly attempt to embed individual
entrepreneurs in social contexts that surround
new venture creation.
INDUCTION AND NEW VENTURES
In this section we theorize how, in social con-
texts of speaking, entrepreneurs use inductive
reasoning to create a meaningful opportunity
for a novel venture and attempt to convince oth-
ers of that opportunity in order to gain much-
needed support. We first provide an introduction
to the key concepts of analogy and metaphor as
primary forms of inductive reasoning. Through
such reasoning entrepreneurs verbally create a
hypothetical world in which they highlight dis-
cursive objects to themselves and others (Quinn
& Dutton, 2005). A discursive object is a noun or
noun equivalent in a propositional phrase that
can refer to a physical or material entity (e.g., a
technological innovation) or a symbolic entity
(e.g., a societal role for a new venture).
Although we focus exclusively on verbal acts
of sensemaking, we acknowledge that material
circumstances and objects may trigger or an-
chor verbally produced conceptual images or
scenarios for a venture (e.g., Hutchins, 2005), but
this is beyond the scope of this paper. Also,
while we do not address the specific ways in
which the material environment or physical ob-
jects may prime or anchor entrepreneurial
sensemaking, Baker and Nelson (2005) and
Denrell, Fang, and Winter (2003) demonstrate
that this is accomplished through a correspon-
dence between conceptualizations expressed in
words and potential or realized combinations of
physical resources.
ANALOGICAL AND
METAPHORICAL REASONING
When entrepreneurs perceptually sense or
feel that there may be an opportunity for a ven-
ture in a particular industry, they make that
opportunity intelligible to themselves and oth-
ers through inductive reasoning (Hill & Leven-
hagen, 1995). Because no entrepreneur, however
prescient, can see into the future or know with
certainty how decisions and actions will pan
out, they necessarily rely on inductive reasoning
for this purpose. By inducing images or scenes
of how new ventures are likely to function in an
industry and grow, or, alternatively, of how
entrepreneurs want them to function and
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grow, entrepreneurs as well as relevant others
(e.g., investors and employees) achieve some
ability to comprehend the opportunity for a
venture and the future consequences of deci-
sions and actions.
Specifically, the literature on induction (e.g.,
Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff, & Boronat, 2001; Hol-
land, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986; Nisbett
& Ross, 1980) generally explicates how using
analogies or metaphors—that is, verbally refer-
ring to other cases and domains of experience—
can guide thinking and create understanding
and social acceptance. It suggests that entrepre-
neurs may invoke analogical or metaphorical
comparisons with other cases and experiences
to familiarize themselves and others with a new
venture, to reduce uncertainty, and to support
further inferences (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn,
2001; Sternberg, 2004; Ward, 2004). Analogies and
metaphors are useful in this context because
they “convey relationships to concepts already
understood . . . [and hence] facilitate the con-
struction of meaning by the person or group
experiencing them” (Gioia, 1986: 53). As part of
sensemaking, analogies and metaphors give
structure, allowing entrepreneurs to make sense
of puzzling or unfamiliar situations (e.g., Gioia,
1986; Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994),
and produce links to action by virtue of the in-
ferences for action that they evoke (e.g., Gioia,
1986; Weick, 1995). Besides structuring situations
into an understandable format, analogies and
metaphors also socially justify decisions and
actions to others (Creed, Langstraat, & Scully,
2002) by validating some accounts and discred-
iting or preempting others (e.g., Rindova,
Becerra, & Contrado, 2004; Weick et al., 2005).
Strictly speaking, analogies and metaphors
are verbally drawn similarities with other cases
and experiences that are either directly ex-
tended to a new venture situation (as the target)
or elaborated in interaction with the target as a
basis for inferences (e.g., Gentner et al., 2001).
The difference between analogies and meta-
phors rests in the literal versus figurative nature
of the comparison (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998,
2002). Analogies, in the context of new ventures,
involve literal references to cases and observa-
tions associated with entrepreneurship, market,
or industry contexts, and ventures and busi-
nesses in general. An analogy, in other words,
conjoins cases from the same category of obser-
vations (e.g., Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005;
Terlaak & Gong, 2008). Metaphors, on the other
hand, refer to figurative—and hence cross-
categorical—comparisons (Cornelissen, 2005;
Lakoff, 1993), where the creation of a new ven-
ture is likened to cultural domains of experience
(e.g., parenting, sports, and warfare) outside a
specific entrepreneurial or business context
(Cardon, Zietsma, Saparito, Matherne, & Davis,
2005; Rindova et al., 2004). As a result, the new
venture in a particular industry is not simply
represented to be as or like other ventures or
industries (as in the case of analogies) but as if
it resembles in some form a literally unrelated
but culturally familiar domain of experience.
The specific analogies and metaphors that en-
trepreneurs use can be already familiar and
conventional or wholly novel and creative (Cor-
nelissen, 2005). Entrepreneurs may simply ex-
tend conventional analogies or metaphors in
their speech to the new venture situation as the
target. This kind of induction is known as a
projection-first model (Gentner et al., 2001), since
the analogical or metaphorical reasoning in-
volves the direct projection of an entrenched
description of a source domain onto a target
domain, after which it is corrected and adjusted
to the target (see also Cardon et al., 2005; Far-
joun, 2008; Gavetti et al., 2005: 696). Entrepre-
neurs may also draw novel analogical or meta-
phorical comparisons in relation to a new
venture (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005). This kind of
induction is known as an alignment-first model,
since entrepreneurs discursively align the
source and target and elaborate the comparison,
before any likely inferences can be drawn from
the source to the target (e.g., Fauconnier, 1997;
Gentner et al., 2001). Alignment-first models are
creative and may deliver emergent inferences
that, when evaluated and verified in relation to
the target of a novel industry, may turn out to be
credible and useful (Cornelissen, 2005; Stern-
berg, 2004).
The use of analogies or metaphors in relation
to new ventures is, we argue, conditioned by the
degree to which an entrepreneur has had previ-
ous experiences in and has learned about the
same or similar industries in which the new
venture will be based (Shane, 2000, 2003). It is
also conditioned by the activation of social pres-
sures to demonstrate the predictability and le-
gitimacy of a venture to stakeholders (Aldrich &
Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). These two
determinants influence the extent to which as
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well as how an entrepreneur uses analogical or
metaphorical reasoning during the initial
stages of exploring ideas and planning and
launching a venture. Indeed, in the initial
stages of a venture, entrepreneurs squarely rely
on analogical and metaphorical reasoning to
create the opportunity for new ventures and to
set these apart from what already exists while
locating their ideas within stakeholders’ exist-
ing understandings in order to gain acceptance
and support (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Santos
& Eisenhardt, 2009). After the launch, and when
the venture achieves a turnover and early
growth as indicators of its profit-making abil-
ity (Hite & Hesterley, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz,
2002), entrepreneurs generally become less re-
liant on inductive reasoning. Instead, they
may shift to more calculated reasoning that is
based on direct experiences and the perfor-
mance of the new venture in its industry (Al-
drich & Fiol, 1994; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001;
Hill & Levenhagen, 1995).
In the next section we unfold these arguments
and illustrate our main propositions with case
examples of novel ventures in nascent markets
that emerged through the confluence of the com-
puting, electronics, and telecommunication in-
dustries in the mid 1990s (Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009). Santos and Eisenhardt’s (2009) original
study described how entrepreneurs framed the
existence of novel markets and subsequently sig-
naled the leadership and feasibility of their ven-
tures in these markets. We shed new light on their
cases by demonstrating how they exemplify the
main inductive processes and determinants
within the initial stages of venture creation.
PRIOR EXPERIENCE AND
INDUCTIVE REASONING
Goodman (1955) gave a well-known account of
the basis of inductive reasoning—one pointing
toward the historical practices and experiences
of entrepreneurs, particularly their language
use rather than simply their psychology (Sloman
& Lagnado, 2005). He claimed that induction may
consist of a mental habit formed by past obser-
vations and experiences but that language is
driving whatever past regularities are selected
and thus projected onto a novel or future situa-
tion. Goodman (1955) specifically argued that
the entrenchment of language affects inductive
reasoning. In short, entire verbal descriptions or
specific words are entrenched when they and
their metaphorical extensions have historically
figured in this usage.
Applied to entrepreneurship, this means that
through depth of experience in or through learn-
ing about one or multiple industries, entrepre-
neurs may have entrenched descriptions of the
key features driving success or performance in a
particular industry (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006;
Gavetti et al., 2005; Haunschild & Miner, 1997).
For example, based on depth of experience in
the media industry, an entrepreneur may ver-
bally describe the industry as one where “ad-
vertising is key because intrinsic product qual-
ity is hard to assess, and therefore customers’
taste is easily shapeable” (Gavetti & Warglien,
2007: 7). Depth of experience refers to the time
spent by an entrepreneur operating in or learn-
ing about a particular industry (Gavetti et al.,
2005). The principle of entrenchment suggests
first of all that those entrepreneurs with depth of
experience in industries deemed relevant to the
new venture will refer to their past descriptions
of those industries and will analogically project
these onto the novel venture as a working hy-
pothesis. This also implies that novice entrepre-
neurs or those without experience in relevant
industries do not have any direct analogies to
hand and therefore face a clear sensemaking
imperative (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Saras-
vathy, 2004). As a consequence, these entrepre-
neurs are likely to draw on entrenched, idio-
matic words or expressions in their speech that
they metaphorically extend to the new venture
as a way of creating understanding for them-
selves and others (e.g., Cardon et al., 2005; Dodd,
2000; Nicholson & Anderson, 2005). Specifically,
we argue that in the absence of directly relevant
prior experiences and observations, entrepre-
neurs will induce metaphors to suggest an oppor-
tunity and to construct a basic scenario for the
creation and commercialization of a new ven-
ture in an unfamiliar industry (Hill & Levenha-
gen, 1995; Sarasvathy, 2004). This leads to our
first proposition.
Proposition 1: The degree to which en-
trepreneurs have depth of experience
in industries related to the target in-
dustry for the new venture is associ-
ated with the use of analogies (pres-
ence) or metaphors (absence) when
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they are initially speaking to others
about the venture.
In addition, those entrepreneurs with prior ex-
perience may also have a certain breadth of
experience in that they have observed or
learned about different industries. Combining
breadth with depth of experience means that
some entrepreneurs have fully developed verbal
descriptions that distinguish multiple industries
on the basis of significant features, such as, for
example, the size of economies of scale, the size
of customer switching costs, and the heteroge-
neity of customer tastes (Farjoun, 2008; Gavetti
et al., 2005). Where entrepreneurs indeed have
depth and breadth of experience in multiple in-
dustries, we argue that they are likely to refer to
those descriptions of industries that are caus-
ally specific and include multiple features, as
opposed to descriptions built around features
that are isolated or generally less entrenched
(cf. Goodman, 1955).
Gentner highlights, in this respect, the pre-
ferred use of relational analogies, where there is
“an assertion that a relational structure that nor-
mally applies in one domain can be applied in
another domain” (1983: 156). The emphasis here
is on the relationships between features in the
relevant source domain and their underlying
causality, as opposed to analogies that simply
highlight common features between industries
(Gentner & Clement, 1988; Gentner et al., 2001).
Where entrepreneurs have access to multiple
such causal descriptions for relational analo-
gies, Goodman (1955) predicts that the entrench-
ment (i.e., repeated mention) of parts of such
descriptions (e.g., around economies of scale
and customer tastes) determines the likelihood
of their use. A good example of these principles
is the case of Magic, a venture based on “cus-
tomer-centric online shopping” (Santos & Eisen-
hardt, 2009: 650). When the venture was founded,
online shopping was a novel concept and one
that was poorly understood. There was confu-
sion about basic elements of the service, includ-
ing how to evaluate products and how to make
payments (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 650).
The entrepreneur behind Magic who faced these
challenges coined the analogy of seeing online
shopping like (offline) retailing—specifically,
like the experience of supermarket shop-
ping—an image that provided a clear model for
the new venture. The user interface, for exam-
ple, became based on such concepts as “self-
service,” “shopping cart,” and “checkout.” This
analogy also led to the inference that the entre-
preneur needed to provide the world’s widest
selection in its product category—an insight
stemming from the source image of a self-
service retail shop selling a wide range of prod-
ucts and services with economies of scale in the
supply chain (buying, checkout selling points,
and self-service).
The induction of the retail supermarket image
in this example suggests that entrepreneurs do
not import random facts or features from a
source to a target but instead prefer to project
inferences that build on a whole set of relations
that can be discursively projected to or aligned
with a target domain (cf. Gentner & Clement,
1988). The retailing domain was also intimately
familiar to the founding entrepreneur and Magic
executives. Retailing concepts had already been
an established part of their vocabulary while
speaking to each other (cf. Goodman, 1955). This
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Entrepreneurs with
depth and breadth of experience in
multiple industries are likely to in-
duce analogies that highlight a com-
mon set of relations between an (ex-
perienced or observed) industry and
the target industry when they are ini-
tially speaking to others about a novel
venture.
As mentioned, entrepreneurs with a lack of
prior industry experience need to draw on idi-
omatic words and expressions metaphorically
to create meaning, reduce uncertainty, and pre-
scribe a course of action (e.g., Gioia, 1986; Hill &
Levenhagen, 1995). In this circumstance entre-
preneurs will initially be primed, we argue, to
draw upon basic argument constructions be-
cause these are entrenched in language use in
general (Goldberg, 1995). Argument construc-
tions include grammatical forms with a subject
and operative verb, such as to give (the ditran-
sitive construction—i.e., where the verb can take
a direct and indirect object); to make or to cause
(the resultative construction); or to move, to go,
or to enter (the caused motion construction).
These constructions are prime material for met-
aphorical reasoning and “encode as their cen-
tral senses event types that are basic to human
experiences” (Goldberg, 1995: 39). For example,
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entrepreneurs often refer to “leveraging” a cli-
ent base, “building” market awareness, “ex-
panding” market share, “acquiring” market ac-
ceptance (Martens et al., 2007: 1118), “getting
new customers,” or “making it happen” (Saras-
vathy, 2004). In this way they metaphorically
suggest that they can physically manipulate
and control markets as if these were objects.
The entrenchment of argument construc-
tions—and their preferred use for metaphorical
induction—is consistent with Lakoff and John-
son’s (1980, 1999) embodiment hypothesis. The
basic hypothesis is that the inductive creation of
metaphorical meaning is directed and con-
strained in that individuals choose from a finite
number of semantically autonomous argument
constructions and their associated embodied
source domains (i.e., human motor actions in-
volving physical movement or physically hold-
ing or manipulating an object).
A good example of this thesis is the case of
Secret, another venture studied by Santos and
Eisenhardt (2009). Secret’s founders began with
a sophisticated cryptography technology but
without a clear model of the venture or a well-
defined product or market in mind. They exper-
imented with several ideas while talking to
each other and started to focus on the develop-
ment of a security product in the context of dig-
ital communications. One executive honed in on
the notion of trust, which he described as “not
just security in terms of keeping people out but it
also was letting people in” (Santos & Eisen-
hardt, 2009: 649; emphasis added). The basic
metaphorical image of the controlled movement
of people in and out of a system provided the
impetus for the new venture and defined the
product in comparison to standard security tech-
nology focused on restricting access. Secret’s
executives therefore emphasized trust as central
to the new venture’s identity and its product.
However, ambiguity in the market remained,
prompting them to adopt additional metaphors
to describe their venture for would-be customers
and other stakeholders, as well as for them-
selves (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 649). To em-
phasize the product’s ability to support and
control legitimate movements in digital commu-
nications, they shifted to a metaphor of border
control. According to Santos and Eisenhardt,
“They used well-known terms such as ‘ID card,’
‘wallet,’ and ‘passport’ as part of their vocabu-
lary” (2009: 649). This particular framing gained
acceptance, as illustrated by the following
quote from Secret’s venture capital backer: “You
know, you have kind of an electronic wallet and
have all your IDs on one thing, and it would
become your passport around the net” (Santos &
Eisenhardt, 2009: 649).
As this example illustrates, the default induc-
tion of argument constructions may be corrected
or adjusted when entrepreneurs speak to stake-
holders and gain feedback, a point that we will
return to below. For now, it is important to high-
light that such a correction or adjustment pro-
cess is likely to operate as a gradual process
(Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Based on the plausibil-
ity of the communicated image for the venture
and the ambiguity in the market, an adjustment
away from the default inductive base is made
until a satisfactory solution is reached (Good-
man, 1955). Specifically, this means that default
basic argument constructions (such as the
caused motion construction of people moving in
and out of a digital system) are primed for met-
aphorical induction and will initially be ad-
justed with further information on cultural do-
mains, such as, for example, border control
(Santos, & Eisenhardt, 2009) or, alternatively, en-
gineering (Sarasvathy, 2004), parenting (Cardon
et al., 2005), theater, or warfare (Dodd, 2000; Ni-
cholson & Anderson, 2005). These cultural do-
mains still include concrete, embodied activi-
ties, but their adjustment involves further detail
on the culturally specific context of such activi-
ties that may resonate with stakeholder expec-
tations and understandings (Hannan, Po´los, &
Carroll, 2007). When such anchoring in further
cultural knowledge is still unsatisfactory in
terms of stakeholder comprehension and sup-
port, the correction process continues and
shifts, as we explain below, toward alterna-
tive cultural metaphors that have a history of
use but may be a move away from the initial
basic argument constructions (Epley & Gilo-
vich, 2006). However, in the initial stages of a
venture, we expect the default induction of
argument constructions that are metaphori-
cally used to describe the basic idea of the
venture in the target industry. This leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 3: Entrepreneurs who lack
prior experience in industries associ-
ated with the new venture are likely to
extend argument constructions meta-
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phorically when they are initially
speaking to others about it.
THE MEDIATING INFLUENCE OF
UNCERTAINTY AND LEGITIMACY
While making sense about and identifying
new opportunities for ventures plays a central
role in the process of new venture creation, it is
not sufficient simply to envision an opportunity.
Rather, for a venture opportunity to succeed, en-
trepreneurs need to convince relevant others
(e.g., investors and employees) publicly of the
feasibility and legitimacy of the venture and, as
a result, gain their support (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
Starr & MacMillan, 1990; Zott & Huy, 2007). Given
that most start-ups or new ventures lack proven
track records, entrepreneurs need, while speak-
ing, to construct accounts that help explain, ra-
tionalize, and promote a new venture and re-
duce the uncertainty typically associated with it
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).
Their sensemaking has to demonstrate to others
the feasibility of any new venture and its poten-
tial for wealth creation.
Entrepreneurs, as we have argued, will ini-
tially draw from their own experiences to in-
duce, while speaking, the opportunity for a
novel venture and will seek to gain initial feed-
back from others, without yet committing them-
selves publicly to a venture or a particular
course of action (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Hite &
Hesterley, 2001). At the outset, entrepreneurs are
likely to speak to a small circle of close contacts
(e.g., Hite & Hesterley, 2001), most stemming
from preexisting social, family, or historical re-
lationships (e.g., Hite & Hesterley, 2001; Stam &
Elfring, 2008). They will, as we have argued, use
analogies or metaphors to articulate basic im-
ages or scenes of both cause and effect, but with
many essential elements initially undefined
(Sarasvathy, 2001, 2004). Such images or scenes
are further explored and possibly revisited as a
result of communication with others (Alvarez &
Barney, 2007).
When such initial images and scenes evolve
into a more determinate commitment, entrepre-
neurs need to convince other individuals (e.g.,
potential employees) and investors who have
direct business or capital links to support the
venture (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Mosey &
Wright, 2007). The broader range and diversity of
people that entrepreneurs speak to may activate
added pressures to make the venture under-
stood and legitimate in the eyes of others (Han-
nan et al., 2007). Entrepreneurs will be motivated
to resolve this uncertainty and to adapt their
reasoning in such a way that they demonstrate
efficacy. They may be prompted to elaborate or
to replace the image or scene for the novel ven-
ture in an attempt to explain it to stakeholders.
They may also be triggered to adapt their sense-
making so that their accounts make direct refer-
ences to implications for growth (Baron & Mark-
man, 2000; Baum & Locke, 2004; Chen, Yao, &
Kotha, 2009).
Specifically, in the early stages of a venture,
entrepreneurs need to reduce stakeholders’ un-
certainty, at least in part with the goal of dem-
onstrating the predictability and cognitive legit-
imacy of the venture (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Predictability relates
to uncertainty about the probability of the suc-
cess of the new venture or uncertainty stemming
from a lack of information about cause-effect
relationships in a particular industry. This un-
certainty primes the use of analogies and met-
aphors in an entrepreneur’s speech to others
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).
In the absence of a performance track record
that entrepreneurs can point to, they often rely
on analogies or metaphors to provide an induc-
tive rationale that projects a trajectory for the
venture (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).
Cognitive legitimacy refers to the comprehen-
sion and taken-for-grantedness of a new venture
(e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Zimmerman & Zeitz,
2002). When incentives for legitimacy are high,
because of the absence of rival entrepreneurial
ventures with similar innovations or of rival
firms operating in the same industry, entrepre-
neurs often rely on analogies and metaphors to
put the novel venture within a familiar frame of
reference and to legitimize its existence (Harga-
don & Douglas, 2001; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).
As Lounsbury and Glynn argue, entrepreneurs
need to “make the unfamiliar familiar by fram-
ing the new venture (often through metaphor
and analogy) in terms that are understandable
and thus legitimate” (2001: 549).
These two main factors (uncertainty and cog-
nitive legitimacy), we argue, mediate the use of
analogies and metaphors while entrepreneurs
communicate about the venture to stakeholders
in an effort to gain their behavioral support.
Figure 1 depicts the overall process model of
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entrepreneurial sensemaking during the early
stages of venture creation, including the medi-
ating role of uncertainty and legitimacy.
In line with Figure 1, we argue that entrepre-
neurs reinforce, adapt, or replace the initially
induced image or scene of the venture, depend-
ing on the feedback of others and in response to
stakeholder perceptions of uncertainty and the
cognitive legitimacy of their ventures. Rein-
forcement is like to occur when the induced im-
age or scene is easily comprehended, reduces
uncertainty about the venture’s predictability,
and is perceived as legitimate by stakeholders
(Zott & Huy, 2007: 94–95). For example, when
entrepreneurs can make relevant links to their
past experiences with ventures in related indus-
tries or to certain competencies acquired
through previous ventures, they can analogi-
cally refer to these as a way of strengthening
trust in a venture in a novel industry and, hence,
increasing its predictability (Martens et al., 2007;
Zott & Huy, 2007).
In the case of Magic, its analogical model of
“customer-centric online shopping” was rein-
forced in all of its communications after the
model had been quickly accepted by the market.
One outside expert confirmed the success of
these reinforcement tactics when he commented
that “Magic has become the default name when
you think of buying on the net” (Santos & Eisen-
hardt, 2009: 651). While the venture was quickly
understood and was seen as destined for suc-
cess, the executives of Magic did encounter
some customer insecurity surrounding the low
legitimacy of online shopping at the time. In
response, Magic slightly adapted its sensemak-
ing by widely disseminating another story that
metaphorically referred to U.S. history, portray-
ing the founder as a “pioneer moving west” to
“open up a new frontier” (Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009: 651). This was meant to increase the legit-
imacy of the nascent market to customers and,
in turn, the ability of the venture to profit from it.
Adaptation refers to a reformulation or elabo-
ration of the induced image or scene for the
venture. It is a process at the level of a previ-
ously articulated basic image or scene. It occurs
when prior entrenched descriptions serve as an
automatic base for the induction of a basic
scene but are further extended and elaborated
in response to a persistent need for efficacy and
until uncertainty and legitimacy in the eyes of
stakeholders are satisfied. Baker et al. illustrate
the process of adaptation in their observation
that, in interactions with employees, entrepre-
neurs added analogies or metaphors (e.g., of the
venture organization as a “family”) that they
had “made up on the fly to make their fledgling
firms seem comfortable and normal—that is, le-
gitimate—to potential employees” (2003: 263). In
turn, such social constructions “became part of
employee expectations and the emerging cul-
ture of the organization after the people [had]
joined the firm” (Baker et al., 2003: 263).
The example of Secret also illustrates the pro-
cess of adaptation during the early stages of
launching a venture. Initially, as mentioned, the
model for the venture had been induced on the
back of an argument construction that had, after
a few iterations, shifted to the metaphor of se-
curity, or rather trust, in the case of border con-
trol. Secret’s executives disseminated stories
and organized events to convey its unique “trust
identity” and intertwined it with a market for
trust services (a conception that was distinct
from competing market conceptions of selling
security products). They also signaled their
leadership by setting online certification stan-
FIGURE 1
Entrepreneurial Sensemaking and the Venture Creation Process
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dards for this nascent market. Investors had ac-
cepted the image early on. Uncertainty about
the legitimacy of the market, however, persisted
in the eyes of customers; this prompted Secret’s
executives to adjust their projected identity by
analogically “adding the template of a ‘public
utility’ that conveyed the ubiquity and high re-
liability of a trusted service” (Santos & Eisen-
hardt, 2009: 650). This adjustment helped them
gain legitimacy for their venture and the nas-
cent market. This elaborated vision also guided
later decisions, such as which activities to pur-
sue (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 650). In other
words, as a result of interactions with stakehold-
ers, these kinds of adapted images become “so-
cial constructs that guide subsequent actions of
these entrepreneurs and others associated with
an industry or market—including customers and
suppliers” (Alvarez & Barney, 2007: 15).
Replacement refers to the substitution of the
initial induced image with an alternative anal-
ogy or metaphor in response to persistent uncer-
tainty and low levels of legitimacy in the eyes of
stakeholders. It refers to the process where en-
trepreneurs substitute, while speaking, the ini-
tial image and its associated elaborating ele-
ments toward stakeholders with “later verbal
articulations [providing] a framework for devel-
oping shared understanding” (Hill & Levenha-
gen, 1995: 1071). Haven, another venture studied
by Santos and Eisenhardt (2009), is a good ex-
ample of this process. Haven’s founder had
stumbled upon the nascent market of online
marketplaces. He personally valued egalitari-
anism and fused these values into an identity
for the venture using the metaphorical frame of
“community,” which led to an emphasis on how
“friends” could connect, share information, and
trade in a “safe neighborhood” (Santos & Eisen-
hardt, 2009: 651). Although this identity was clear
and understood within Haven itself, the team
experienced some difficulties in explaining this
to prospective customers. Thus, it decided to re-
place the community image with a more factual
account of the venture’s existence based on a
balanced, fair marketplace for buyers and sell-
ers. This approach failed, however, and led to a
return to the “community identity,” which was
subsequently emphasized through the dissemi-
nation of a romantic and personal (albeit ficti-
tious) story about the founding of the venture.
Generally speaking, the adaptation and re-
placement of initially induced images for a ven-
ture are done to quell concerns about its predict-
ability and legitimacy (Figure 1). As mentioned,
this adjustment or correction process is likely to
operate as a gradual process (Epley & Gilovich,
2006) in which, based on the plausibility of the
initial image for the venture and the ambiguity
in the market, an adjustment away from the
default inductive base is made until a satisfac-
tory solution is reached (Goodman, 1955). Ini-
tially, entrepreneurs are likely to elaborate or
extend the induced image by adding further
analogies or metaphors. In the case of Secret,
the additional public utility analogy blended
coherently with the initial trust image and
helped communicate the predictability of the
venture to customers. These kinds of elabora-
tions or extensions, providing they are coherent
in terms of the underlying representation, may
help tune communication about the feasibility
of the venture toward specific stakeholders or
audiences. Combinations of analogies and met-
aphors are possible because although exact in-
terpretations may vary between stakeholders
and audiences, their intuitions about the under-
lying representation tend to be largely consis-
tent in terms of causes, individual roles, inten-
tionality, and manner of actions (Gibbs &
O’Brien, 1990).
Besides addressing the uncertainty about a
venture and its predictability, an entrepreneur’s
adjustments of the image for a venture may also
be guided by assessments of the plausibility of
the analogy or metaphor and its ability to confer
legitimacy on the new venture. Douglas (1986)
famously argued that new conventions, such as
claimed new markets or ventures, gain institu-
tional legitimacy on the back of a “naturalizing
analogy”—a drawn parallel or association with
another domain that sustains the novel conven-
tion by demonstrating its fit with the natural
order. In her analysis, when the association with
the other domain points to strong parallels with
relations “found in the physical world, or in the
supernatural world, or in eternity, anywhere, so
long as it is not seen as a socially contrived
arrangement” (Douglas, 1986: 48), the status and
taken-for-granted nature of this source domain
may by association justify the reasonableness
of the new convention.
Recently, Hannan et al. (2007) argued that the
grounds for legitimacy stem from the degree to
which a venture (or indeed any other organiza-
tion) is seen by a stakeholder audience as a
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default or prototypical member of an existing
category or domain of understanding. This ar-
gument is akin to Glucksberg, McGlone, and
Manfredi’s (1997) account of analogies and met-
aphors as category-inclusion statements in
which a new venture such as Magic is posi-
tioned as a central or prototypical instance of
novel, ad hoc constructed categories, such as
online shopping (Gentner et al., 2001). With such
category-inclusion statements, potential catego-
ries are generated or invoked from the source of
the comparison (e.g., offline shopping) while
sets of modifiable dimensions are simulta-
neously identified in the topic (e.g., self-service
shopping on the web). The interpretation of the
legitimacy of the analogy or metaphor, thus, is a
kind of negotiation between the category of under-
standing prototypically associated with the
source and the dimensions of the described target.
If the target is indeed judged by stakeholders to be
a prototypical member of the ad hoc constituted
category (i.e., online shopping), then the compari-
son is more likely to confer legitimacy.
The foregoing discussion leads to the follow-
ing general propositions regarding the mediat-
ing influence of uncertainty and legitimacy on
entrepreneurial sensemaking in interactions
with stakeholders. Analogies and metaphors
are reinforced, adapted, or replaced until uncer-
tainty about the venture’s predictability is sat-
isfied and cognitive legitimacy is attained, at
which point the motivation diminishes.
Proposition 4: The degree of uncer-
tainty regarding the predictability of
a venture in an industry mediates the
likelihood that entrepreneurs will rely
on their initial analogies or metaphors
when speaking to others. A high level
of uncertainty is associated with an
adaptation or replacement—and a
low level of uncertainty with a rein-
forcement—of these initial analogies
or metaphors.
Proposition 5: The degree of cognitive
legitimacy of a venture in an industry
mediates the likelihood that entrepre-
neurs will rely on their initial analo-
gies or metaphors when speaking to
others. A low level of legitimacy is
associated with an adaptation or re-
placement—and a high level of legit-
imacy with a reinforcement—of their
initial analogies or metaphors.
DISCUSSION
In this article we have elaborated a process
theory of new venture creation that highlights
the role of entrepreneurs’ sensemaking to them-
selves and to others whose understanding and
support are critical to a venture’s success. We
have argued that in the absence of a perfor-
mance trajectory, entrepreneurs rely on induc-
tive (analogical or metaphorical) reasoning to
create and justify a rationale for a novel venture
that accounts for its existence and garners the
necessary support from relevant stakeholders
and resource providers. We next discuss the
implications for theory and research on entre-
preneurship, sensemaking, and new venture
creation.
Contributions and Implications
First, we believe this article illustrates the
significant potential that exists for a focus on
sensemaking (Taylor & Van Every, 2000; Weick
et al., 2005) to contribute to existing theories and
concerns within entrepreneurship research. To
date, research on entrepreneurial cognition and
research on the institutionalization of novel ven-
tures have tended to remain relatively self-
referential (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2007), with a
significant gap between them as a result of the
rather different scholarly traditions and meth-
ods associated with positivist psychology and
interpretive sociology (e.g., DiMaggio, 1997). Al-
though this may have been necessary for each
of these research streams to develop a strong set
of theoretical and methodological principles
(e.g., Baron & Ward, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2002),
we believe that it is time to integrate their in-
sights into a more comprehensive and proces-
sual understanding of how entrepreneurs de-
velop and explore ideas for a novel venture,
plan and launch their ventures, and seek to ac-
quire support and legitimacy to sustain and
grow these ventures over time.
The sensemaking approach that we have
elaborated in this paper focuses on how entre-
preneurs, while speaking, construct meaning
about novel ventures for themselves and others
in the early stages of the venture creation pro-
cess. This particular approach provides a fertile
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area for such integration, with its assumptions
regarding the socially constructed nature of re-
ality and its singular focus on the verbal speech
acts through which entrepreneurs simulta-
neously envision and rationalize the potential
for novel ventures. In developing our model, we
have attempted to show not only the common
threads that cut across the areas of entrepre-
neurial cognition and institutional theory but
also how systematic, empirically useful theory
can be derived from their integration. Specifi-
cally, we have combined determinants (prior ex-
perience and uncertainty about the predictabil-
ity and legitimacy of a novel venture) derived
from cognitive and institutional theory and have
specified how together they impact the entrepre-
neurial process by which new ventures are
imagined, developed, and sustained over time.
Thus, we believe our work highlights that the
connection between cognitive and institutional
theory in entrepreneurship has significant po-
tential for both theory development and empiri-
cal research.
A second implication involves the specifica-
tion of varieties of inductive analogical and
metaphorical reasoning about novel ventures.
Scholars recognize induction as central not only
to how entrepreneurs envision novel opportuni-
ties (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005; Baron & Ward,
2004; Sarasvathy, 2001, 2004; Sternberg, 2004) but
also to how they legitimize those opportunities
to others (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zott &
Huy, 2007). Yet very little existing research on
entrepreneurship has provided a theoretical
specification of when and how entrepreneurs
use specific analogical or metaphorical compar-
isons as an inductive anchor to reason about a
venture in a novel, unfamiliar industry. We ad-
dress this shortcoming by defining the determi-
nants and variety of analogical and metaphori-
cal reasoning in venture creation processes. In
so doing we contribute directly to central ques-
tions about how opportunities for a novel ven-
ture are identified or created (e.g., Alvarez &
Barney, 2007; Baron & Ward, 2004) and how the
institutionalization of a novel venture occurs
over time (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Santos
& Eisenhardt, 2009). Our model extends the cog-
nitive tradition by specifying the processes and
conditions of inductive reasoning by which en-
trepreneurs envision opportunities for novel
ventures. Within this tradition these processes
have often been implied as invariant and auto-
matic psychological processes (e.g., Baron &
Ensley, 2006) rather than directly theorized
(Baron & Ward, 2004; Ward, 2004). Further re-
search, we suggest, can draw directly on the
propositions on prior experience and inductive
(analogical or metaphorical) reasoning to study
the cognitive processes by which the opportu-
nity for a novel venture is created or identified.
Our model also extends institutional research
on entrepreneurship and begins to explain how
and why, through inductive reasoning, the insti-
tutionalization of a venture may occur (e.g.,
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Phillips et al., 2004).
Institutional research has been largely silent on
how the content or structure of speech reflects
and shapes the institutionalization process and
how entrepreneurs, through inductively gener-
ated associations and arguments, establish
shared understanding and legitimacy for their
novel ventures (e.g., Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009;
Zott & Huy, 2007). Such associations and argu-
ments may be analogically connected to institu-
tionalized standards and conventions in any
given industry (Hannan et al., 2007) or to the past
experiences of an entrepreneur, but they may
also involve creative metaphorical comparisons
or coherently blended images that provide the
basis for institutionalization. In making these
distinctions, we believe that we have enriched
the institutional literature. Lounsbury and
Glynn (2001) and Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002)
argue that there is a limited understanding of
the symbolic processes through which new ven-
tures are framed as viable and legitimate busi-
nesses. By identifying varieties of inductive rea-
soning and by formalizing them into a set of
propositions, we point to a number of ways to
study the institutionalization of new ventures.
A third implication relates to the proposed
process model of entrepreneurial sensemaking.
This model adds to process studies of entrepre-
neurial action (McMullen & Sheperd, 2006; Zott &
Huy, 2007) in that it theoretically links cognitive
and symbolic activities performed by entrepre-
neurs across the early stages of setting up new
ventures. As such, it is more widely applicable
than studies that have focused on specific
stages, such as the launch or initial public of-
fering of a new venture (e.g., Chen et al., 2009;
Martens et al., 2007). Underpinning the model is
a theory of sensemaking as a socially situated
process by which individuals construct meaning
while speaking. This definition of sensemaking
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applies to the context of new ventures—where
the demands of online sensemaking require
that individual entrepreneurs think by speak-
ing, meaning that conscious thought emerges
in the act of speaking with others (Hill & Lev-
enhagen, 1995)—but potentially also extends
to sensemaking in other social and organiza-
tional settings.
Existing research on sensemaking, however,
largely separates individual cognition, or sense-
making, from symbolic “sensegiving” processes
in social or organizational settings (see Maitlis
& Sonenshein, 2010; Weick et al., 2005). We argue
instead that language and thought interpene-
trate in context and that meaning develops as a
result of interactions with others. In the classic
case of the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 1993),
for example, when the spotters on the aircraft
had labeled the fire as a “10 o’clock fire,” the
firefighters on the ground committed them-
selves to this interpretation and believed it to be
a fire that was relatively contained. According
to Weick (1993: 635), they also reinforced and
“rationalized this image until it was too
late”—an analysis that points to the formative
effect of language and to social validation in
reifying the circumstances the firefighters faced.
Another more recent study of the hijacking of
United Airlines flight 93 (Quinn & Worline, 2008:
501) demonstrates how people aboard the plane
responded to this “shocking and incomprehen-
sible” event by constructing a sensible narrative
that allowed them to deliberate the action of
collectively counterattacking the hijackers. The
narrative evolved while people on the plane
were phoning their close relatives and partners
for approval and emotional support, which, in
turn, gave the passengers the confidence to go
ahead with their courageous counterattack
(Quinn & Worline, 2008).
Although settings of crisis and change are not
necessarily the same as the early stages of ven-
ture creation, there are clear parallels across
these sensemaking scenarios in the sense that
individuals, drawing from their own experience
and identity, construct meaning of inchoate cir-
cumstances, while speaking with others, and
reinforce, replace, or adapt their sensemaking
in the context of voiced or perceived social ex-
pectations. This particular formulation offers the
potential for a more parsimonious perspective
on sensemaking that, we argue, may benefit
research. Over the past fifteen years, sensemak-
ing has become an increasingly popular um-
brella construct (Hirsch & Levin, 1999) that has
usurped divergent theoretical principles
around, for example, cognitive dissonance, the
autonomic nervous system, behavioral enact-
ment, social identity, behavioral routines, emo-
tions, speech acts, and escalation of commit-
ment (e.g., Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005).
Integration of these principles into a single con-
struct is laudable, but it lacks specificity and
provides broad, rather than specific, guidance to
empirical research.
A fourth related and final implication con-
cerns the empirical examination of speech and
communication in entrepreneurship research.
The constructs and propositions in our model
can be readily connected to techniques for the
identification and analysis of analogies and
metaphors (e.g., Cornelissen, Oswick, Chris-
tensen, & Phillips, 2008; Putnam & Fairhurst,
2001) and their use in the context of entrepre-
neurial sensemaking (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn,
2001)1. For example, further research may sys-
tematically study argument constructions (Gold-
berg, 1995), which provide the inductive core
around which entrepreneurs elaborate larger
scenarios or narratives for their ventures. Such
studies will buttress the arguments and analy-
ses of the burgeoning tradition of interpretive
research on entrepreneurial narratives (e.g.,
Martens et al., 2007).
We furthermore believe that a key strength of
our theorizing is that it provides a potential
foundation for empirical process studies of the
proposed links between an entrepreneur’s prior
experience and speech, social contexts of speak-
ing, and institutionalized discourses in an in-
dustry, using either a qualitative or quantitative
research design. Each of the theorized links that
we have elaborated and illustrated with case
examples (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) can pro-
vide the focus for intensive qualitative investi-
gations that might serve to confirm or refute our
arguments, as well as flesh out the details of
these complex relationships. The model could
1 We restrict our focus here to verbal analogies and met-
aphors. We acknowledge that inductive reasoning may also
involve analogies or metaphors in other “modalities,” in-
cluding the drawing of pictorial images or the construction
of prototypes or artefacts (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2008), but
this is beyond the scope of the paper. We thank one of the
reviewers for providing this insight.
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also inform a quantitative examination of the
dynamics of entrepreneurial speech and the in-
stitutionalization of ventures in an industry over
time, with the propositions that we have devel-
oped forming the basis for a set of testable hy-
potheses. This would require the assembly of a
database of novel ventures in specific indus-
tries, speech acts of novice and experienced en-
trepreneurs, and the measurement of perfor-
mance outcomes and the legitimacy of ventures
over time. This database would need to be large
enough to allow for systematic comparisons;
such a study might easily be done in the form of
a longitudinal study of novel ventures in a par-
ticular set of industries so that other factors
might be at least partially controlled.
Conclusion
In this article we have theorized about how
inductive reasoning through analogies or meta-
phors is central not only to how entrepreneurs
envision an opportunity for a novel venture but
also to the way in which they communicate
about that venture so that it can be understood
and made acceptable and legitimate in the eyes
of key stakeholders. Connecting strands of cog-
nitive and institutional research, we highlighted
two determinants (prior experience and uncer-
tainty about the predictability and legitimacy of
a novel venture) that influence how entrepre-
neurs envision and rationalize the opportunity
for a novel venture. These contributions can be
used to reconceptualize and guide the study of
how entrepreneurs imagine venture opportuni-
ties and of how they simultaneously develop
and legitimize new ventures to exploit such
opportunities.
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